Private military and security companies (PMSCs) are a fast-growing global industry. While the rise of PMSCs and their activities have attracted much media coverage and growing scholarly attention, little is known about their sourcing of masses of military labour from the global South. This exploratory study examines the case of Fiji, whose thousands of ex/current disciplinary force personnel and unemployed men have been contracted by PMSCs to provide security work in Iraq and other high-conflict areas. The article shows this to be an instance of unequal core-periphery military labour trade, outlining its scale, processes and impacts on the migrants. It also illuminates how the migrants' collective agency is demonstrated even under powerful structural constraints.
INTRODUCTION
While mercenaries have existed for centuries (Fabre, 2010) , today's private military and security companies (PMSCs) 1 emerged in the early 1990s, "driven by three dynamics: the end of the Cold War, transformations in the nature of warfare that blurred the lines between soldiers and civilians, and a general trend toward privatisation and outsourcing of government functions" (Singer, 2005) . PMSCs, although presented as civilian security providers, have not only taken over support functions such as transport, logistics and maintenance from militaries, but provided armed protection to individuals and sites, and undertaken armed security operations akin to those conducted by military forces (Bjork and Jones, 2005) .
PMSC combat operations in Angola and Sierra Leone drew much attention in the 1990s, followed by a surge in the use of PMSCs by the United States and coalition governments in Afghanistan and Iraq in the wake of the US-led invasions. According to Krahmann (2012) , 30,000 and 24,000 armed contractors were in Iraq and Afghanistan respectively in 2010 (Krahmann, 2012) . Today, with the American/coalition forces withdrawing from Iraq and Afghanistan, the security vacuum is being filled by PMSCs, who continue to find extensive demand especially for private-sector protection (Sen, 2015) . Del Prado (2008) estimates the industry's annual yield at US$100-120billion.
There has been considerable journalistic coverage and civil societyan protest concerning PMSC activities, especially incidents of abuse and other transgression (e.g., Chatterjee, n.d.; Woolf, 2015) . This is paralleled by growing scholarly literature investigating related issues, including the growth of PMSCs as a manifestation of Western state-corporate expansionism (Whyte, 2003) , the implications of the PMSC growth fortheir impact on peacebuilding/ and peacekeeping (Bjork and Jones, 2005; Brayton, 2002) , PMSCs'their ambiguous legality and regulatory frameworks (Krahmann, 2012) , and the lack of accountability of PMSCtheir conduct (Peters, 2006; Francis, 1999) and justification for the use of PMSCs (Fabre, 2010) . Recently, Fraser (2013) shed new light on the industry by highlighting the vulnerability of PMSC personnel's vulnerability who are susceptible to exploitation by the companies'PMSCs' "coercive offers". But
To our knowledge, however, tThe industry has been, however, discussed predominantly as a Western corporate phenomenon, with no existing study specifically examineslimited attention to its the experiences of PMSC personnelworkers recruited from the global South. Indeed, much current research discusses PMSCs as primarily Western corporate phenomena. , which obscures the extensive involvement of military labour from the significantly lower costs than metropolitan recruits. Consequently, there exists a lacuna of analysis of private military and security labour trade through the experiences of migrants from the global South.
We aim to fill this gap by exploring the voices and experiences of Fijians contracted by PMSC personnels for migration from Fiji todeployment in conflict zones. Much likeSimilar to the Gurkhas, Fijians are amongst those categorised as a "martial race," which makes Fiji a key PMSC labour supplier along with Nepal, Uganda and Kenya (Stachowitsch and Chisholm, 2016) . Furthermore, like the Gurkhas, Fijians experience highly exploitative and physically and psychologically consequential relations with PMSCs, which has received scant research attention. By focusing on Fijian experience, we seek to contributeprovide further empirical knowledge of the industry's recruitment of and effects on global South military/security labour as well as to draw some theoretical insights from this knowledge.
Fiji is a The Pacific island nation , with a population of 866,000 (ADB, 2015) ,that has undergone multiple economic challenges due mainly to political instability (coups d'etat in 1987, 2000, and 2006 ) and external shocks. The average annual GDP growth dropped from 5.5% in the 1970s to 0.8% in the 2000s (Prasad, 2012) . Only 40% of the labour force is in the formal sector, and of this, only 36% is in continuous paid employment (ADB, 2012) . Forty-five percent of the population lives in poverty (Narsey, 2014) . In this context, migration to metropolitan countries, beginning around the 1970s, has become an important source of employment and remittances. Emigration to metropolitan countries began around the 1970s (Mohanty, 2006; Connell, 2006; Voigt-Graf, 2008 , Kaitani, et al., 2011 . Earlier migration was mostly permanent and dominated by Fijians of Indian descent, especially following the 1987 and 2000 ethno-nationalist coups. Since the 1990s, an increasing number of indigenous Fijians have been migrating, often temporarily, for remittance-generating purposes. These include Fijians recruited by the British Army (BA), Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) soldiers on United Nations (UN) and other peacekeeping missions, nurses, other health workers, rugby players, and PMSC personnel.
Researchers have studied the characteristics and impacts of Indo-Fijian emigration (e.g., Pangerl, 2007; Voigt-Graf, 2005) and temporary migration of skilled workers such as nurses and teachers (e.g., Reddy et al., 2004; Voigt-Graf et al., 2007) . Extensive research attention has also been given to the impact of remittances on social protection and migration intentions (Jimenez and Brown, 2013; Leeves, 2009; Kaitani, et al., 2011) , political instability as a migration determinant (Narayan and Smyth, 2004) , and human capital loss as an emigration cost (Reddy et al, 2004; Chandra, 2004) . In other words, the existing literature centres around the patterns, intentions, benefits and costs of (especially skilled) migrations, with an emphasis on their development impacts on Fiji as a developing country. However, PMSC personnel movement has received only limited discussion, despite some researchers noting its significanceit as one of the largest contemporary indigenous Fijian migrations (e.g., Voigt-Graf, 2008; Connell, 2006) . The only detailed investigation is presented in Maclellan's (2006) journalistic study on a rising number of Fijian military migrants in the mid-2000s. Most of the existing documentation is in the Fijian mass media, especially two national newspapers, which in the early 2000s gave prominent coverage to PMSC personnel deaths, injuries and recruitment disputes.
In this article, we present an exploratory study to illuminateoutline the scale, processes, and impacts of Fijian PMSC personnel migration to conflict zones with a focus on migrants' voices and experiencesthrough the lens of the migrants. Our discussion is , guided by the following research questions: It should be noted that the present study focuses specifically on Fijian PMSC personnel migration to high-conflict areas, especially Iraq and Afghanistan, although Fijians have been employed as security personnel in various other countries and in non-conflict areas,
including Papua New Guinea and Australia. Our analysis is informed by Wallerstein's (2004) World Systems Theory as a broad perspective to understand the structural context, but not as a rigid framework disregarding migrants' agency. The core-peripheryal model has been widely applied to migration research in the past, providing a conceptual framework for analysing labour mobility within "the structure of economic forces in core and periphery [which] … condition migrants to sell their labour in places where needed and at the cheapest possible price" (Portes, 1978: 1) . This has been prominent in discussions of "brain (and brawn) drain", underdevelopment and other detrimental migration impacts (e.g., Papademetriou, 1985 , Binford, 2003 . More recently, there has been a shift since the 2000s from "neo-Marxist pessimism" towards more optimistic estimations of migration, especially the role of remittances in poverty reduction and economic growth (de Haas, 2010) . Nevertheless, we will show in the following sectionsdemonstrate below that understanding PMSC procurement of Fijian military/security labour requires an analytical framework that accounts for the structural conditions of global private military/security labour trade.
Here, our research illuminates the continuing relevance of politico-economic models in understanding contemporary migrations by showing that Fiji's PMSC personnel movement is indeed an instance -perhaps a quintessential one -of unequal core-periphery labour trade.
At the same timeSimultaneously, we acknowledge the limitations of deterministic models and the need for a multi-layered approach. We take note of the tendency in research until recent years to give primary attention to economic structural dynamics of migration (Pajo, 2008) . While we highlight the structural inequities shaping PMSC personnel migration, especially in light of the current migration optimism and remittance research boom, we seek to understand how such processes and consequences are played out, experienced and negotiated "on the ground". Our goal is to understand the power dynamics of PMSC personnel migration through migrants' lived experiences. This approach is informed by de Haas's argument (2010: 241) that "an improved theoretical perspective on migration and development has to be able to account for the role of structure -the constraining or enabling general political, institutional, economic social, and cultural context in which migration takes place -as well as agency -the limited but real capacity of individuals to overcome constraints and potentially reshape structure."
METHODS
We employed two qualitative data collection methods. First, we conducted 18 semistructured interviews between July 2015 and May 2016 with 12 PMSC personnel and four wives of PMSC personnel, including the widow of a man killed on duty. The men's ages ranged between 36 and 67. All had been employed in Iraq between 2003 and 2014, while five had also worked elsewhere. The interviewees were recruited through a snowball sampling method. The interviews were conducted in English, and the transcribed data were put to thematic coding, which identified salient themes and concepts guided by the research questions. The interview data will be quoted in indented paragraphs or in inverted commas, with the interviewees referred to by pseudonyms.
Second, due to the scarcity of previous research, we examined all issues of the Fiji Times, daily newspaper with the largest circulation, dated from January 2000 to June 2016, and selected issues of the other daily newspaper the Fiji Sun, to collect relevant information.
Additionally, the Fiji Bureau of Statistics, RFMF and BA were contacted for relevant statistics.
FIJI'S HISTORY OF "MUSCLE TRADE" AND PMSC PERSONNEL MIGRATION
Fiji has a long history of military "muscle trade" originating from its involvement in World Wars, especially World War II, where 8,000 Fijians joined the Allied forces in the Solomon Islands, and gained a reputation for bravery (Lal, 1992) . This was followed by the Malayan War, when Fiji sent 1,600 troops to the Commonwealth forces. Following peacekeeping missions than any other nation (Siegel and Feast, 2014) . The participation in these, along with the war involvement, has established an international reputation for Fijian soldiery and engendered national pride in this reputation. Furthermore, it has become a major source of employment and remittances, reportedly earning Fiji well over US$300million since 1978 (Siegel and Feast, 2014) .
Recruitment of Fijians into the BA started in 1961/1962 (Ware, 2012) . Since then, thousands of (mostly indigenous) Fijian men (and a few women) have been contracted by mainly US-and UK-based PMSCs to work as "security guards" in Iraqi (and some Afghan) cities, with some in supportive roles in Kuwait in engineering, mechanical, and information technology (World Bank, 2006 (Rina, 2006) , with the majority likely to have been PMSC personnel.
Most personnel have prior discipline force experience (see Table 2 ). Many were in the military's territorial force or resigned from the military/police forces to take up PMSC contracts, the duration of which varies widely, from a few months to a few years. There are two main pathways for PMSC migration. First, many PMSCs previously had local recruitment agents facilitating enlistment and despatch. In 2005, there were five such agencies. While this has dropped to just one today, it is possible to apply online with some PMSCs. Second, once the recruits reach Iraq, many attempt to secure their next contract with another company while still abroad, anticipating contract expiry or following disputes with employers. Fijians contracted by various companies actively assist each other in this process. Consequently, many have made a career out of PMSC work, having served multiple contracts with multiple companies.
Our interviewees received an average monthly wage of US$2,216, although their individual wages vary significantly, from US$724 to US$7,000 (see Table 2 ). While not all PMSC personnel are employed for 12 consecutive months, it is worth noting that their pro rata annual income is about triple Fiji's average household income (approximately US$8,252 per annum in 2008-2009) (ADB, n.d.). Given significant income differences among individual wages, however, some personnel may earn about the same as the average household income.
RISKS AND COSTS OF UNEQUAL "MUSCLE TRADE"
Fraser (2013: 240) highlights the vulnerability of metropolitan PMSC contractors who are left "with a skill set and a mindset that make re-entry into civilian life difficult." Our findings show that Fijian PMSC workers experience greater vulnerability and exploitation specific to the dynamics of core-periphery "muscle trade."
Socio-economic conditions of the trade
Fijian PMSC workers' experiences must be understood in the context of local socioeconomic conditions that motivate -and necessitate -entry into military labour trade. In the face of scarce employment opportunities and the absence of state unemployment benefits, those without formal qualifications or skills must sustain themselves and their families by any means available. In this context, PMSC contracts are deemed extremely lucrative. Our interview data suggest that, while some do not fully understand in advance the extent of the risks of the job, most are clearly aware of it and yet willing and indeed desperate to take a chance in return for a livelihood. Their primary, and in most cases only, motivation for PMSC migration is financial. of military labour and companies dictate terms and conditions. Such power differential compels Fijians to bear significant costs and risks of the trade.
Financial risks and costs
Despite the perception of large financial gains, PMSC remuneration is sometimes considerably smaller than initially believed or anticipated. There have been media reports of wage disputes, which five of our interviewees experienced themselves. Two did not receive contracts until after leaving Fiji. Inoke, for instance, had been promised a US$7,000/month salary, but when he and others were en route to Iraq, US$1,500/monthcontracts were distributed aboard the aeroplane. Others were misled by agents regarding duties, leave provision and other working conditions. 3 These episodes illustrate that the workers' ability to bargain with PMSCs/agents is undermined by lack of economic and cultural capital -i.e., their great need to secure a contract, and their lack of awareness of the importance of scrutinising contract provisions, ability to read English, and/or ability to comprehend legal language. Agents often "just give us the contract and say 'Sign.' It's like a stick and carrot thing. They lure you with a carrot and when you get there, the stick is, if you don't sign, you are required to fly back to Fiji with no job" (Samuela).
Moreover, PMSC work entails long-term financial insecurity repercussions. PMSC contracts are for fixed periods and may be terminated at any time depending on company circumstances and other contingencies. This may abruptly leave them jobless, despite their attempts to secure another contract. Consequently, many fall into a cycle of PMSC work for a few months to a few years, followed by a sometimes-considerable period of unemployment or unskilled employment, until the next contract is secured. Between/after contracts they typically work as security guards or taxi drivers in Fiji: Emele's husband earned F$2.50 (US$1.20) per hour as a security guard at the time of the interview. In Epeli's words: "Whatever [we are] making is hand-to-mouth existence. People think going to Iraq makes millions. No, we don't! With this kind of contract, you hardly make just enough for the family to make ends meet, for risking your life."
Physical risks and costs
In addition to financial precariousness, PMSC deployment exposes them to extreme physical risks and life-threatening situations. As highlighted by Fraser (2010: 547), PMSC personnel, by international law, are "neither civilians nor soldiers: they belong to that grey category of unlawful combatants, who are liable to being killed with impunity … but are denied the rights and privileges of soldiers." All the interviewees were deployed in Iraq's "red zones" (high-risk areas outside Baghdad's fortified, "green zones") and some in "black zones" ("where all Americans have pulled out" [Petero]). They experienced frequent, sometimes daily, insurgent attacks including ambushes, roadside bombs, sniper attacks and mortar bombs on duty or at camps, and some were involved in combat situations. Furthermore, they undertook their duties under extremely physically demanding conditions. Convoy drivers were required to drive at 120-190km/hour for up to 7-8 hours without stopping, to avoid roadside bombs and other attacks. Personal security detail officers accompanied clients in highly volatile areas, deploying defensive fighting positions, which sometimes prevented them from changing clothes or bathing for several days.
There is great variation in the levels of physical protection provided by PMSCs. Some interviewees were equipped with arms, body armour, and fully protected/armed vehicles, whereas others were unarmed or entirely without protective gear. Rupeni, for instance, worked as escorting convoy personnel for the Iraqi currency exchange in unprotected, soft-shell vehicles, from which all doors had been removed to ease personnel movement, exposing them directly to attacks (see Figure 2) . The same type of vehicle was given to were injured in the leg in mortar bomb attacks, were only provided with medical treatment immediately after the incidents. Timoci suffers from pain 10 years later, while Petero walks with a limp and pays for his own medical rehabilitation. Taniela, whose eye was badly injured by a roadside bomb, wears dark glasses at all times due to strong pain caused by light.
Psychological costs
None of the interviewees' employers provided counselling or other psychological support. Unlike post-deployment "decompression" programmes offered to uniformed soldiers, most Fijian PMSC personnel are flown to Fiji with no such provision, left to their own devices to reintegrate into civilian life and cope with psychological (and physical) effects of deployment. 
PRIVATISATION OF MILITARY/SECURITY WORK AND CORE-PERIPHERY CHAINS OF EXPLOITATION
As illustrated above, Fijians entre into military labour trade in a context of vulnerability, driven by their need to earn a livelihood in a society with little social protection, where those without formal skills/qualifications choose between subsistence farming, low-paid employment, informal employment, and unemployment. This vulnerability renders them highly susceptible to "coercive offers" of PMSCs, whereby they are compelled to offer low-cost military labour -remarkably cheaper than uniformed soldiers or Western PMSC personnel.
The financial implications of PMSC employment are not necessarily favourable as noted above. Even for those who earn more than the average income, it remains open to question if that is indeed a "fair" return for undertaking high-risk duties that would otherwise be carried out by American/coalition soldiers, with much less physical protection, and much less or no compensation or post-deployment support. While returning soldiers' postdeployment hardships are widely publicised (e.g., Military.com, 2005) , and Western PMSC personnel's dissatisfaction with "a token effort at support followed swiftly by abandonment" is documented (Fraser, 2013: 241) , most Fijian workers have recourse to no support, entirely left on their own to bear the financial, physical and psychological costs of the military labour. Their labour is also strikingly cheaper than that of Western PMSC colleagues, who may in fact command higher salaries than regular soldiers. According to Krahmann (2012) ,
Western PMSC personnel in Iraq could earn up to US$200,000 a year, over seven times our interviewees' average salary. OurThe interviewees, like the Gurkhas in Chisholm's studiesy (2014a, b), invariably noted such differential wages: "All the white men -they
[PMSCs] paid them good. Us Fijians -they paid us peanuts. They think we don't know what the money is worth" (Petero). Inoke, for instance, received US$1,500/month, in contrast to US$10,000/month paid to American colleagues performing the same duties.
Many also noted differential leave and holiday allocations.
Emerging from this is a picture of a global chain of outsourcing and exploitation of military labour, with Fijians and possibly other peripheral military migrants at the bottom.
The US/coalition governments outsource military labour to PMSCs for political and economic reasons, especially domestic opposition to national troop deployment in highconflict areas (Brayton, 2002) , and market-based, privatisation and cost-cutting policies (Isenberg, 2009) . PMSCs, in turn, source military labour from not only Western exsoldiers but also large "reserve armies" of soldiers, police officers and unemployed men in peripheral societies . 4 like Fiji and Nepal. The latter provide a particularly lucrative labour market for PMSCs for economic and political reasons similar to those that motivate state outsourcing of military labour. Fijians accept severely exploitative contract arrangements, which require minimum investment in remuneration, prior training, physical protection, insurance cover or psychological support. Furthermore, such arrangement is less likely to invite political scandals or protests than in metropolitan countries. Fijian government ministers, religious/community leaders, civil society organisations and mass media voiced their concerns in 2004/2005, leading to government attempts to monitor and regulate the recruitment. Subsequently, however, domestic political turmoil, which culminated in a military coup in 2006 and interim government rule until 2014, preoccupied media, state, and public attention. Further eclipsing the matter was the declining BA intake in the late 2000s. PMSC migration hence became marginalised as a policy/media matter and assumed a greater aspect of inevitability. In short, the economic and political uncertainty and vulnerability of the country have allowed PMSCs to source military labour on their own terms, with minimal local resistance or interference.
It is in the context of such unequal trade that PMSCs have grown into a vastly profitable industry. Global Risk, the key PMSC employer of Fijians, reportedly had a US$4.5 million/month contract with the American Coalition Provision Authority in 2005. In 2008 American agencies awarded US$85billion for military/security contracts in Iraqi (Isenberg, 2009 ). The industry presents typical characteristics of core-peripheral labour trade, whereby transnational PMSCs seek out peripheral countries with required labour as well as political challenges and weak economic conditions for profit maximisation.
PMSC MIGRANT AGENCY
While Fijians are subjected to inequities of the core-periphery military labour trade, our interviewees showed that they are far from helpless or unknowing victims. First, they are critically aware of their own geopolitical structural position and the disparity inherent in the trade. Inoke, among many, noted: Second, their decision to enter into PMSC trade is a rational one, based on conscious choice of a livelihood for themselves and their families over risks. As discussed, many are acutely aware of the severity of possible consequences, yet resolute in their decision to take on the unfair system, negotiate its costs and bear its risks to secure an income.
While this is clearly a manifestation of structural coercion, it also reflects their conscious engagement with the system, even if it may be a "losing battle" in the final analysis.
Third, they demonstrate collective resilience in the face of overwhelming adversities.
Their resolution to get through PMSC work is propelled by mobilisation of pride in Fiji's martial tradition, similar to the way Gurkha PMSC personnel draw strength from the colonially-constructed Gurkha identity as a "martial race" (Chisholm, 2014b) . As Jone explained: "Fijian soldiers -not only soldiers -any Fijian is a warrior. The technical things, the procedures of war, these things they [PMSCs] have now were in Fiji before
Christ came" (Jone). They also employ culturally-embedded strategies to cope with deployment challenges. In addition to regular devotions they organise, with some taking turns in acting as "the pastor of the day," talanoa (storytelling), drinking yaqona 5 together, laughing and joking, which play a pivotal role in strengthening relationships and mutual sharing in Fijian culture, work as coping mechanisms (Figure 3 ). Samuela explained that, although radio was to be used for operational news only, "half the time, Fijian boys were chatting over the radio" in Fijian. They joked together in some of the most extreme situations: "Especially in war zones like that, joking carried us through."
Importantly, this discussion does not trivialise their affliction but illuminates their ability to exercise their agency even under the most onerous, exploitative conditions. They employ these strategies to collectively negotiate the hardships of deployment in the absence of formal protection/support, although this does not diminish the oppressive nature of their circumstances. CONCLUSIONS This article has outlined the possible scale, processes and impacts of Fijian PMSC personnel migration as well as the migrants' experiences of and responses to PMSC employment. Fijian PMSC personnel migration started around the early 2000s and expanded rapidly through mass recruitment, which is estimated to have sent over 1,000
Fijians annually to Iraq and other high-conflict areas. Our findings show this is an instance of unequal labour trade that takes place in a broader context of global "muscle trade."
Against a backdrop of increasing neoliberal privatisation, states outsource military labour required in conflict-affected areas from PMSCs as an economically and politically expedient solution. PMSCs in turn source necessary military labour from: 1) ex-Special
Force and other ex-personnel of metropolitan militaries; and 2) large and desperate "reserve armies" of ex-disciplinary force personnel and unemployed men in peripheral societies. Whilst Western ex-soldiers are vulnerable to PMSCs' coercive offers due to their socio-economic disadvantages, Fijians are doubly exploited due to their vulnerability specific to core-periphery power imbalances. PMSCs offer them markedly lower wages and make minimum investment in their prior training, physical protection, insurance cover and post-service psychological support, compelling them to bear significant financial, physical, and psychological risks and costs of military labour. (Law and Peng, 2008) , shared Sunday activities (Lan, 2003) and conversations across balconies (in the case of domestic workers) (Pande, 2012) to name a few. The case of Fijian PMSC workers presents another informal yet notable strategy for migrant worker agency. Aware of their marginal geopolitical structural position and their vulnerability, they actively (and often desperately) submit themselves to the trade, but with critical consciousness. They also mobilise culturally-embedded strategies, ranging from embracing Fijian warrior identity and religiosity to joking, laughing and drinking yaqona together to cope with imminent risks and the absence of protection/support provision. In this context, Fijians are not only victims of the global chain of military labour outsourcing and exploitation, but also knowledgeable and competent actors who take on the muscle trade system by mobilising a range of personal, collective, and cultural resources.
Our exploratory research is intended as a contribution towards a greater understanding of both the structural dynamics of this growing and consequential labour trade and the agency of human subjects demonstrated even under most powerful structural constraints.
Although this article focused on Fiji, the dynamics of the trade discussed here may apply to other cases of military migrants from the global South.
Formatted: English (United States) rather than "mercenary", while acknowledging the debates over the definitions of these (and other related) terms (Krahmann, 2012) , primarily due to PMSCs'the distinctive, characteristicscorporate nature of PMSCs, especially their corporate nature. 2 "Operation ICE" or the Iraqi Currency Exchange refers to the Coalition Provisional Authority's replacement of the previous Iraqi currency with a new currency between October 2003 and January 2004. It involved large-scale security services for the transportation of money to banks branches around Iraq (Coalition Provisional Authority , 2004) . 3 There is great variation in leave provisions, ranging . Iin our interviewees' cases, they range from a three-month-work and one-month-leave cycle to a 12-month-work and one-month-leave cycle. During deployment, most interviewees were allowed holidays with varying intervals, but one worked 12 hours every day for three years as a military truck driver. There is less variation in insurance provisions. As discussed later, PMSC personnel are typically insured for death but not for injury. 4 Nepal and Uganda were noted by our interviewees as prominent PMSC labour suppliers other than Fiji. 5 Yaqona refers to the plant piper methysticum and the drink made from it, which has much ceremonial/social significance in Fijian society. Over 1 
